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Supplemental Jurisdiction-Take It to the
Limit!
HOWARD P. FINK"

I believe that rather than looking for ways to repair the supplementaljurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, while, at the same time, striving to
preserve the complete diversity requirement in diversity and alienage cases, we
should instead think about extending supplemental jurisdiction toward its outer
constitutional limit and eliminate the complete diversity requirement of
Strawbridgev. Curtiss.' Congress could, for example, simply eliminate present
28 U.S.C. § 1367(b).' This would provide new power to the federal courts to
solve national problems, particularly in the areas of mass tort and mass disaster

litigation, and, in business litigation in general. Such a change has long been
advocated by some3 and, indeed, seems to be striking a responsive chord today
4
in Congress.
Thus, the latest attempt of the American Law Institute ("ALI") to strain to
preserve the complete diversity requirement of Strawbridge v. Curtiss5 in

diversity and alienage cases is misguided and arguably out of date.6
The present version of § 1367, particularly subsection (b), has been widely
criticized.7 Reading many of the accompanying articles in this Symposium issue

* Isadore and Ida Topper Professor of Law, The Ohio State University.
1. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806). However, so long as there is a jurisdictional amount
requirement, diversity and alienage jurisdiction will not be extended absolutely to their outer
constitutional limits.
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) (1994) reads:
In any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded
solely on section 1332 of this title, the district courts shall not have supplemental
jurisdiction under subsection (a) over claims by plaintiffs against persons made
parties under Rule 14, 19, 20, or 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or
over claims by persons proposed to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19 of such
rules, or seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24 of such rules, when
exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with
the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332.
Id.
3. See Howard P. Fink, IndispensablePartiesand the ProposedAmendment to Federal
Rule 19, 74 YALE L.J. 403, 446-47 (1965); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OFTHEDIVISION
BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS, TENTATIvE DRAFT NO. 2, at 36, 137-38 (1964).
4. See H.R. 1252, 105th Cong. (1998) (enacted), which was adopted by the House of
Representatives on April 23, 1998, and provided, inter alia, for minimal diversity in actions
arising from accidents involving more than 25 people each of whom suffered injuries of more
than $50,000. The bill is discussed further below. See infra note 30.
5. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267.
6. See AMERICAN LAW INsTITuTE, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CODE REVISION PROJECT,
TENTATIVE DRAFT NO. 2 (1998).
7. For commentary pro and con upon the present version of 28 U.S.C. § 1367, see Thomas
C. Arthur & Richard D. Freer, Close Enough for Government Work- What Happens When
Congress Doesn't Do Its Job, 40 EMORY L.J. 1007 (1991); Thomas C. Arthur & Richard D.
Freer, Graspingat Burnt Straws: The Disasterof the Supplemental JurisdictionStatute, 40
EMORY L.J. 963 (1991); Richard D. Freer, Compounding Confitsion andHamperingDiversity:
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will show how complex are the proposed solutions to drafting a supplementaljurisdiction statute that, at the same time, preserves the rule of Strawbridge v.
Curtiss in diversity and alienage cases and, nonetheless, provides for
supplemental jurisdiction in a manageable, understandable and coherent fashion.
If subsection (b) were simply eliminated from § 1367, this would end the
Strawbridgev. Curtissrule and it would eliminate all of the issues about complete
diversity, disputes over what is the "free-standing claim," who is the "primary"
plaintiff, whether there is jurisdiction over a claim by a plaintiff against a thirdparty defendant in a diversity or alienage action, and vice-versa,8 and whether
there is jurisdiction with regard to an indispensable party-plaintiff who seeks to
intervene in an action as of right pursuant to Rule 24." If there were minimal
diversity between any plaintiff and any defendant, and the jurisdictional amount
were present as to one plaintiff's claim, other plaintiffs could join pursuant to
Rule 20 if they had claims arising out the same transaction, transactions, or series
of transactions as the diverse plaintiff's claim. 0 Defendants could be joined on
a similar basis."
It is true that some courts have narrowly construed § 1367(b) and have allowed
some supplemental jurisdiction in diversity cases and alienage cases since the
adoption of § 1367 in 1990.2 But other cases have not. 3

Life After Finley and the SupplementalJurisdictionStatute, 40 EMORY L.J. 445 (1991); Denis
F. McLaughlin, The FederalJurisdictionalStatute-A Constitutionaland StatutoryAnalysis,
24 ARiz. ST. L.J. 849 (1992); Thomas M. Mengler et al., CongressAccepts Supreme Court's
Invitation to Codify Supplemental Jurisdiction,74 JUDICATURE 213 (1991); Karen Nelson
Moore, The SupplementalJurisdictionStatute: An Important but ControversialSupplement
to Federal Jurisdiction, 41 EMORY L.J. 31 (1992); Wendy Collins Perdue, The New
SupplementalJurisdictionStatute-Flawedbut Fixable,41 EMORY L.J. 69 (1992); and Joan
Steinman, Section 1367-Another PartyHeardFrom, 41 EMORY L.J. 85 (1992).
8. Thus overruling Owen Equipment &Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
9. The present language of § 1367(b) specifically prohibits supplemental jurisdiction for
a-plaintiff who qualifies for intervention as of right under Federal Rule 24(a) but who would
destroy complete diversity. The elimination of § 1367(b) would restore the prior practice of
allowing intervention as of right to a plaintiff who would otherwise destroy complete diversity.
Indeed, it would go farther than the former practice, which had refused to allow such
intervention when the outsider plaintiff was an indispensable party-a truly absurd result. See
Pulitzer-Polster v. Pulitzer, 784 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1986); Field v. Volkswagenwerk AG, 626
F.2d 293 (3d Cir. 1980).
10. FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a).
11. See id. 20(b).
12. See, e.g., Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. Press Mechanical, Inc., 77 F.3d 928 (7th Cir.
1996) (holding the jurisdictional amount not necessary where additionally joined plaintiff was
an indispensable party); In re Abbott Labs., 51 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that Zahn v.
InternationalPaper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973), which had required that each member of a
plaintiff diversity class have a claim exceeding the jurisdictional amount, was overruled by 28
U.S.C. § 1367); Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58 F.3d 106 (4th Cir. 1995); Leszczynski v. Allianz Ins.,
176 F.R.D. 659 (S.D. Fla. 1997); see also Laura L. Hirschfeld, The $50, 000 Question: Does
Supplemental JurisdictionExtend to Claims Between Diverse Parties Which Do Not Meet
§ 1332's Amount-in-Controversy Requirement?, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 107 (1995); Mark
Hutcheson, Comment, Unintended Consequences: 28 US.C. § 1367's Effect on Diversity's
Amount-In-Controversy Requirement, 48 BAYLOR L. REV. 247 (1996); Sean G. Saxon,
Comment, Civil Procedure-Freev. Abbott Laboratories: Supplemental Jurisdictionfor
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I believe that all attempts to harmonize the Strawbridgerule with supplemental
jurisdiction will not only fail to achieve simplicity but, more importantly, point
in the wrong direction. We should advocate changes that would open the door of
the federal courts to virtually all mass tort, mass disaster, and major class actions,
where they can best be handled.
Obviously, if nothing else were done, the elimination of the complete diversity
requirement of Strawbridge would vastly increase the number of cases which
could be brought to the federal court originally under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and by
removal from state courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1441. I suggest that the solution to
the inundation threat is for Congress to use the jurisdictional amount requirement
as the governor on excessive use of the federal courts rather than using the
complete diversity requirement as the primary limiting device.
As a concomitant to removal of the complete diversity requirement the
jurisdictional amount requirement in 28 U.S.C. § 1332 could be raised to, say,
$250,000. And Congress would, of course, continue to control entry to federal
courts of state-law cases by future statutory adjustments. Raising the
jurisdictional amount would channel the "big" cases to federal court while
keeping less complex and smaller cases in the state courts. Obviously, keying
subject-matter jurisdiction to the existence of complete diversity does little to
separate "big" cases from "small" cases.
Joinder of claims and parties, in one action, should be encouraged by the courts
and by Congress rather than being discouraged. Bringing more cases involving
wider joinder of claims and parties to federal courts means fewer cases overall in
state courts, and, perhaps, indeed, fewer cases in the nation as a
whole-obviously an efficiency interest. Cases involving more parties and claims
also mean that "whole disputes" will be settled in one action-one of the
paramount ideals of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure14-- and that more
persons will be bound by res judicata after either the settlement of a dispute or a
judgment on the merits, thereby eliminating more future law suits from state and
federal courts. Who is harmed thereby?

PendentPlaintiffs Becomes More Affordable, 27 U. MEm. L. REV. 229 (1996); Joel E. Tasca,
Comment, JudicialInterpretationof the Effect ofthe SupplementalJurisdictionStatute on the
Complete Amount in ControversyRule: A Casefor Plain MeaningStatutory Construction,46
EMORY L.J. 435 (1997); Recent Case, Seventh CircuitHolds that 28 U.S.C. § 1367 Allows
Supplemental JurisdictionOver PermissivelyJoined Plaintiffs in DiversitySuits, 110 HARV.
L. REv. 1173 (1997).
13. See, e.g., Butcher v. Hildreth, 992 F. Supp. 1420 (D. Utah 1998); Parker v. Crete
Carrier Corp., 914 F. Supp. 156 (E.D. Ky. 1996); 6427 Atlas Corp. v. Marine Ins. Co., 155
F.R.D. 454 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Riverside Transp., Inc. v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 847 F.
Supp. 453 (M.D. La. 1994); Lederman v. Marriott Corp., 834 F. Supp. 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1993);
Leung v. Checker Motors Corp., No. 93 C 2704, 1993 WL 515470 (N.D. III. Dec. 7, 1993);
Mayatextil, S.A. v. Liztex U.S.A., Inc., No. 92 CIV 4528 (LJF), 1993 WL 180371 (S.D.N.Y.
May 19, 1993); Meredith v. Schreiner Transp., Inc., 814 F. Supp. 1001 (D. Kan. 1993);
Averdick v. Republic Fin. Servs., Inc., 803 F. Supp. 37 (E.D. Ky. 1992); Pellegrino v. Pesch,
No. 91 C 4967, 1992 WL 159169 (N.D. Ill. June 29, 1992).
14. See CHARLEs E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING (2d ed. 1947);
Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedurein HistoricalPerspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987).
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The immediate reaction that one might expect is that this kind of change flies
in the face of federal court history, acquiesced in by the Supreme Court in case
after case, and by Congress through one revision of the Judicial Code after

another. However, the history of federal court jurisdiction is very complex, and
records many changes by Congress over the past two centuries, often going in

opposite directions' 5 -sometimes enlarging the subject-matter jurisdiction of the

federal trial courts, sometimes retracting it. 6 And what if it would fly in the face
of history? Congress controls federal jurisdiction and can expand it or retract it,
within constitutional limits, as it chooses to do so."7
8
The rule of Strawbridge v. Curtiss"
goes back to an early nineteenth-century
decision of the United States Supreme Court, which, later decisions of the Court
make clear, was a reading by Chief Justice Marshall of a jurisdictional
statute-now 28 U.S.C. § 1332-not an interpretation of the parallel language of
Article III. 9 Even Chief Justice Marshall, who wrote the Court's opinion in
20
Strawbridge, later expressed some serious doubts and regret about the case.
What hold should this decision, rendered in a far different era, continue to have
upon us today?2'

15. See Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the Allocation of JudicialBusiness Between State
andFederalCourts: FederalJurisdictionand "The Martian Chronicles," 78 VA. L. REV. 1769
(1992).
16. While the diversity grant and the Strawbridge v. Curtiss rule have been with us
essentially unchanged from the beginning, except for increases in the jurisdictional amount
requirement, the general federal question jurisdiction was broader when it was added by the
Judiciary Act of 1875 than that which is now provided for in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1441. The
Act of 1875 had allowed for removal-by either plaintiffs or defendants--of an action in which
a substantial federal question was pleaded either in the complaint or as a defense to a state law
claim. This removal jurisdiction, based upon the presence of either a federal claim or a federal
defense, was amended by the Judiciary Act of 1887, precluding removal based upon a federal
defense. And the right to remove was limited to defendants. See the discussion in Tennessee
v. Union & Planters' Bank, 152 U.S. 454 (1894). Until 1980 there was an amount-incontroversy requirement in the general federal-question jurisdictional statute. See discussion
in HOWARD P. FINK ETAL., FEDERAL COURTS rNTHE21STCENTURY 278-80 (1996). Fora
general history of federal court jurisdiction, see 15 MARTIN H. REDISH, MooRE's FEDERAL
PRACTICE §§ 100 app. 01 to 100 app. 02[9] (3d ed. 1998).

17. See FINK, supra note 16, at 163-228.
18. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
19. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523 (1967).
20. See Louisville, Cincinnati, & Charleston R.R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 555
(1844).
We remark too, that the cases of Strawbridge and Curtis [sic] and the Bank and
Deveaux have never been satisfactory to the bar, and that they were not,especially
the last, entirely satisfactory to the court that made them. They have been
followed always most reluctantly and with dissatisfaction. By no one was the
correctness of them more questioned than by the late chiefjustice who gave them.
It is within the knowledge of several of us, that he repeatedly expressed regret that
those decisions had been made, adding, whenever the subject was mentioned, that
if the point ofjurisdiction was an original one, the conclusion would be different.
Id.
21. See Redish, supra note 15, at 1803 & n.175.
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The federal courts are a tremendous engine for judicial reform and
consolidation, but they have not yet been utilized to their full capacity. Why not?
By and large, they have been underutilized because federal judges have feared
increases in their dockets. But an increase in federal court subject-matter
jurisdiction should not come at the expense of overcrowding federal dockets. We
should add Article III federal judges and federal magistrate judges that are
needed to avoid overcrowded federal dockets if federal jurisdiction with regard
to state-law cases were expanded. Indeed the cost of adding federal judges would
be a minuscule item in the federal budget.'
Moreover, as far as our nation as a whole is concerned, the additional cost is
essentially zero, since every case that is not tried in a federal court might
otherwise have been brought in a state court, often in states which have fewer tax
resources than does the federal government and many of whose courts are just as
crowded or more crowded as are some federal courts.23
I suspect that there is also an elitist point of view behind some arguments
against increasing the number of federal judges-that somehow this would
depreciate the "coin" of the federal judiciary, by reducing the overall quality of
federal judges, as if federal judges were somehow inherently superior to those
judges sitting in the state courts. 24 I simply do not believe that there are only
about 500 lawyers or judges in the United States who qualify to the exalted
position of federal judge, that is, who have the requisites of integrity, legal
knowledge and skills, and who know somebody who knows the President!
Much as I respect the federal judiciary, and I do, I do not believe that the
quality of the federal judiciary would be reduced; indeed, it might even be
enhanced, were there to be a bi-partisan effort to make the federal courts the

primary venue for major business litigation. Congress can increase the number of
federal judgeships easily and distribute them to those parts of the country where
they are most needed. And federal judges can be temporarily transferred from one

22. Estimates given to me by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts compiled for
their own budget purposes indicate that the cost of adding a single new federal district
judgeship comes to $958,000 in the first year and $759,000 for each year after that in 1998
dollars. The cost of adding a court of appeals judge is about $866,000 in the first year and
$686,000 each year thereafter, in 1998 dollars. As an Ohio State faculty member, I think
vividly of what would have been the cost ofjust the first day of a questionable invasion of Iraq
that was averted partly because of public sentiment so strongly and clearly expressed here. The
cost of a hundred more federal judges seems easy to bear.
23. See Henry J. Reske, Long-Range Plan Would Cut Federal Cases,81 A.B.A. J. 22, 24

(1995) (discussing the comments of Chief Judge Judith Kaye of the New York Court of
Appeals).
24. See, e.g., Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 59 (1954) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring); Commission on Revision of the FederalCourtAppellate System, Structure and

InternalProcedures:Recommendationsfor Change,67 F.R.D. 195, 398 app. D (1975) (letter
from Chief Justice Warren E. Burger to Sen. Roman L. Hruska, May 29, 1975); Robert Bork,
Dealing with the Overload in Article III Courts, 70 F.R.D. 231, 236-37 (1976); Felix
Frankfurter, Distribution of JudicialPower Between United States and State Courts, 13
CoRNEL, L.Q. 499 (1928); Henry J. Friendly, The HistoricBasis of DiversityJurisdiction,41
HARv. L. REv. 483 (1928).

INDIANA LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 74:161

district or circuit to another to fill particular needs.' There is presently no similar
possibility of moving state court judges from one state to another to fill a
temporary need. Indeed, we might even think about a system in which the
President nominates some federal judges to be "at large," to be used where most
needed given the caseloads of various districts or circuits. So we need not be
deterred by potential costs. We should be guided by logic and should seek the
best policy, not the choices most constrained by political "reality."
Why are the federal courts superior for major business litigation? The federal
district courts are a single, unified, nationwide trial-court system, with judges
who have life tenure and freedom from salary reduction,26 as well as the statutory
power to consolidate cases for pre-trial purposes27 and transfer cases from one
proper venue to another.2" The federal courts have judges who gain national
expertise in general federal-question cases as well as in diversity, alienage,
bankruptcy, patent, copyright, and admiralty cases, and who deservedly have the
confidence of the business community, as demonstrated by the number of
business cases that are initiated in or removed to the federal district courts.
In the class action area today, there is a great deal of confusion and the
possibility, or at least the fear, of excessive influence by lawyers over carefully
selected local judges to settle mass-tort and mass-disaster litigation in ways that
benefit lawyers and defendants, but often do not adequately benefit class
members. After the Supreme Court's decision in PhillipsPetroleum v. Shutts,29
more class actions are being brought in state courts with judges who may have
little or no expertise in handling massive litigation."

25. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 291-292 (1994).
26. See U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 1.
27. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1994). The Supreme Court has recently held that the
Multidistrict Litigation court to which actions have been transferred and consolidated under
§ 1407 may not then transfer to itself the entire case for trial. See Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg
Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 118 S. Ct. 956, 959 (1998). But this is a statutory construction
that can be changed by Congress. See discussion infra pp. 7-8.
28. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1994); see also Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516
(1990).
29. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
30. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 116 S. Ct 873, 877-78 (1996) (holding that
the federal court must give full faith and credit to a state-court settlement, even if the settlement
releases claims that are within exclusive federal jurisdiction); Marcel Kahan & Linda
Silberman, Matsushita and Beyond: The Role of State Courts in Class Actions Involving
Exclusive Federal Claims, 1996 Sup. CT. REv. 219, 242 & n.91; Linda S. Mullenix, New
OpinionsDefer to State Law, Courts, NAT'L L.J., July 29, 1996, at C5.
In response to the problem, in 1998 the House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on the
Judiciary approved H.R. 3789 which would have allowed the removal of class actions from
state court to the federal court so long as there was minimal diversity. See House Subcommittee
Approves Legislation to Ease Removal of Putative Class Actions, 66 U.S.L.W. 2798, 2798-99
(June 30, 1998). The bill did not advance further when Congress adjourned in October of 1998,
but presumably it will be reintroduced.
As to other aspects of the issue of securing collusive settlement in state and federal courts,
see John C. Coffee, Jr., The Corruption of Class Action: The New Technology of Collusion,
80 CORNELL L. REv. 851 (1995); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and the Settlements of Mass
Torts: When the Rules Meet the Road, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 1159 (1995); cf Mark C.Weber,
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Federal legislation has provided for minimal diversity and nationwide service
of process under the Federal Interpleader Act.31 There is nationwide service of
process also provided in many federal statutes.32
Federal courts could lead a revolution in the simplification of the problems of
conflicts of law interstate litigation. As discussed below, it is plausibly argued
that there could be a single set of nationwide conflict of laws rules applied in the
federal courts, particularly in product liability and mass-disaster cases involving
interstate commerce. 3 Indeed the ALI is proposing just such a reform. There
might, of course, be constitutional law problems with this particular item. 4
We thus should consider a unified strategy for using the federal courts to the
utmost in this area. Assuming this is the goal, Congress could approach the
problem in two different ways. One, would be simply to amend § 1367 to remove
all statutory limitation upon supplemental jurisdiction, and raise the jurisdictional
amount-thus focusing on the size of the case. Or it could legislate more
selectively, say in mass-tort or mass-disaster cases, thus focusing on the type of
the case. Moreover, if it followed the latter strategy, Congress could go even
farther and grant such jurisdiction exclusively to the federal courts-as it has
done in patent and copyright cases. 5
This would allow the full battery of federal court power to be utilized to solve
major litigation problems in a court presided over by a federal judge with Article
III life tenure. Thus we already have all the tools in place for a comprehensive
systemic solution to many national litigation problems. We just have to sharpen
them.
Recent developments support the hypothesis that neither the Supreme Court nor
Congress would be averse to an expansion of supplemental jurisdiction. In City
of Chicago v. InternationalCollege ofSurgeons,36 the U.S. Supreme Court has

Managing Complex Litigation in the Illinois Courts, 27 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 959 (1996); and
George T. Conway III, Note, The Consolidationof Multistate Litigationin State Courts, 96
YALE L.J. 1099 (1987).

31.28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1994); id. § 2361.
32. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1994) (regulating service of process in securities cases);
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1965 (1994);
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e) (1994). See also the
discussion by Professor Casad in 16

ROBERT C. CAsAD ET AL., MooRE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE

§ 108.123[2][b] (3d ed. 1998).
33. See infra text accompanying note 40.
34. See infra text accompanying notes 41-44.
35. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1994).
36. 118 S. Ct. 523 (1997). The InternationalCollege ofSurgeons Court held that there is
removal and supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1367(a) and 1441, of a court review
of a city commission's determination in a landmarks case, though that involved an on-therecord review under state law of the agency's action, when it was coupled with a federal
constitutional challenge to the statute under which the agency acted. It was arguable that the
review was an appeal rather than an original action and so should not have been removable to
the federal court, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263
U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). At
the very least, the decision cannot be seen as a grudging acceptance of supplemental
jurisdiction. The Surgeons Court said that while Congress could have limited supplemental
jurisdiction in state administrative review cases, it did not do so. Rather, it was the duty of the
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given an unusually broad reading to § 1367. While the case did not directly deal
with diversity or alienage jurisdiction, the Court can hardly be seen as hostile to
an expansive reading of supplemental jurisdiction.
Moreover, the Court has already recognized a kind of supplemental jurisdiction
in diversity-based class actions, where diversity is only measured by the
citizenship of the representative parties in a plaintiff class, rather than looking for
a coincidence of citizenship of members of the class and those parties opposing
the class.37
On the legislative side, the House of Representatives recently passed House
Bill 1252,38 that would extend the jurisdiction of the federal courts to any
"accident" suit, so long as there is minimal diversity present, where any twentyfive persons have suffered injuries of more than $25,000 each. This is exactly the
direction I would wish Congress to go, but it is applicable only to a limited set of
cases.
However, the changes contained in House Bill 1252 fall into the category of
special legislation. Rather than entirely eliminating § 1367(b), Congress created
a special exception for "accident" cases involving more than twenty-five persons
each of whom has allegedly suffered injuries amounting to more than $50,000.
But the legislation does utilize each of the techniques that I have outlined to
enhance the utility of the federal courts as a vehicle for solving major disputes of
a nationwide character.
Section 10(c) of the bill amends 28 U.S.C. § 1407, which deals with
consolidation for pre-trial purposes of multidistrict litigation. It would partially
overrule the Supreme Court's decision in Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad
Hynes & Lerach39 which had precluded a Multidistrict Litigation court ("MDL
court") from transferring to itself a case for trial which had earlier been
consolidated with other cases in that court for pre-trial purposes under § 1407.
The House Bill provides that the MDL court, in appropriate accident cases, may
try issues of liability and punitive damages and then, if liability were established
in the MDL court, return the case to the federal or state court from which it came,
for trial of ordinary damages.
In addition, the House Bill would provide, for the first time, a national code of
conflicts of law for such accident cases. It sets out factors for the federal district
judge to consider in choosing the applicable substantive law. Such a national law
of conflicts of law has been advocated by scholars and by the ALI.4" However the
constitutionality of such federal conflicts codes or rules may be questioned. It

federal courts to apply supplemental jurisdiction as broadly as Congress has chosen, within,
of course the constitutional limitation of UnitedMine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966),
that the state claim arise out of the same nucleus of operative facts as the federal claim.
37. See Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921); In re Orange Prod.
Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 162 (2d Cir. 1987); 5 TIMOTHY J. CHORVAT ET AL., MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23.07[3][a] (3d ed. 1998).
38. H.R. 1252, 105th Cong. (1998).
39. 118 S. Ct. 956 (1998).
40. See Linda S. Mullenix, FederalizingChoice of Law for Mass-Tort Litigation,70 TEX.
L. REv. 1623 (1992); AMERICAN LAW INsTITUTE, COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT, STATUTORY
PROPOSALS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1993) [hereinafter COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT].
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would seem that the creation of such rules might be held to be constitutional
under the Supreme Court's definition of the constitutionally permissive scope of
federal procedure in Hanna v. Plumer4 -rules that regulate matters that are
rationally capable of falling in the realm of procedure-but unconstitutional
under the Supreme Court's earlier decisions in Erie RailroadCo. v. Tompkins42
and Klaxon v. Stentor Electronic Manufacturing, Co.43 which had held that the
establishment of "local" rules of conflicts of law in nonfederal actions are beyond
the legislative power of the federal government. This dispute would have to be
settled by another decision of the United States Supreme Court."
Indeed, the House Bill does not go as far as Congress might go in extending
federal jurisdiction to utilize the full potential of the federal courts in settling
disputes of a national character. But it uses all the tools that such a national
solution would require. Congress could apply the tools utilized in House Bill
1252 to solve other national problems as well. Mass-tort and product liability
cases go beyond "accidents" as defined in House Bill 1252. Class actions also
often go beyond the subject of "accidents." Congress could decide that the best
national policy would be to provide a vehicle for massive litigation to be brought
in or removed to the federal courts. It could even require that such cases be
brought there, as it now requires federal antitrust, 45 patent and copyright, 46 and
bankruptcy 47 cases to be brought in federal court. Or it could use the
jurisdictional amount requirement to be the dividing line between actions that
must be brought in federal courts and those that would remain in state courts. Or
Congress could preserve dual jurisdiction, allowing litigant choice to determine
the forum in which this national litigation will take place.
To summarize, the tools are all there, the concepts are not novel, and one House
of Congress has already taken the first big step to breaking the hold that Chief
Justice Marshall's offhand opinion in 1804 has for too long a time had upon
federal court jurisdiction. Supplemental jurisdiction is the unused weapon in
Congress's arsenal to solve national litigation problems in the federal courts,
where they belong.
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